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Abstract
In unequal societies, the rich may beneﬁt from shaping economic institutions in
their favor. This paper analyzes the dynamics of institutional subversion by focusing
on the public protection of property rights. If this institution functions imperfectly,
agents have incentives to invest in private protection of property rights. The ability
to maintain private protection systems makes the rich natural opponents of public
property rights and precludes grass-roots demand to drive the development of the
market-friendly institution. The economy becomes stuck in a bad equilibrium with low
growth rates, high inequality of income, and wide-spread rent-seeking. The Russian
oligarchs of 1990s, who controlled large stakes of newly privatized property, provide
motivation for this paper.
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11 Introduction
If the state does not protect economic agents from unlawful expropriation, these agents may
take matter into their own hands. One way to protect one’s property is to maintain a private
system, e.g., to hire a security ﬁrm or to establish corrupt relationship with a public oﬃcial.
An alternative way is to reveal a preference for more public protection of property rights
through the political process, e.g., by voting for an appropriate candidate. In transition and
developing economies, the latter option is often unavailable due to the underdevelopment of
political institutions. As a result, economic agents are forced to invest in private protection.
Economies of scale in private protection provide rich agents with a signiﬁcant advantage
over poor agents in this environment. Furthermore, the rich agents’ ability to gain from
redistribution due to improper protection of property rights makes them natural opponents
of improvements in public protection.
An economy in which the rich support a regime of incomplete protection of property rights
is discussed in Glaeser et al. (2003). Rich agents use their wealth and accumulated political
power to shape economic institutions in their favor. Inequality encourages institutional
subversion by the rich, leading to more inequality.1This paper focuses on the dynamics of
institutional choice; the political process determines the level of redistribution of wealth in
society, which in turn aﬀe c t st h ep o l i t i c a lc h o i c e so ff u t u r eg e n e r a t i o n s .
Transition economies provide a policy laboratory in which economists can study rapid
institutional change (Djankov and Murrel, 2002). The transition experience has shown that
liberalization, macroeconomic stabilization, and de-jure privatization in a former command
economy are not suﬃcient conditions for an upturn in economic activity. Among various
explanations of the continued failure of some economies to achieve sustainable growth, the
inability of the state to promote the development of good economic institutions and the
unexpected stability of bad ones occupies our interest. Our objective is to provide micro-
economic and political foundations for an environment that prevents grass-roots demand
for the protection of property rights from driving the development of new market-friendly
institutions. We demonstrate that, if the rich have enough political power to choose the
level of public property rights protection, the economy may be locked in a stable long-run
equilibrium with weak public protection of property rights.
1Limiting the subversion of property rights protection is the fact that the beneﬁciaries must protect
themselves from each other (Murphy et al., 1993).
2The process of public enforcement and regulation of property rights by the state is in-
ﬂuenced by social demands. Agents reveal their preferences over government policy through
various political mechanisms. Rich agents might be expected to favor full protection of
property rights. However, in many countries, rich agents are the main beneﬁciaries of weak
protection of property rights, which allows them to gain from non-productive activities such
as rent-seeking or other redistributive activities by maintaining expropriation capabilities.
In the absence of adequate public protection of property rights by the state, these rent-
oriented agents can take control of a substantial share of the national economy. In Russia,
the oligarchs’ success at rent-seeking led them to prefer relatively weak protection of property
rights and forced other economic agents to invest in private protection from expropriation.
Due to the oligarchs’ political power, the Russian state has failed to establish and to enforce
a system of clearly deﬁned property rights.
An agent who invests in the private protection of property rights does not necessarily
seek military capabilities. Rather, an investment in relational capital, e.g. in establishing
corrupt relations with state authorities, costly relational contracting, or hiring a lawyer,
may be the appropriate strategy to increase eﬃciency and enhance predictability in business
relations.2Since private protection capabilities can be used to obtain rents, investment in
private protection is a particular type of rent-seeking. Tullock (1980) and many other papers
devoted to unproductive activities model the decision to participate in rent-seeking as a
comparison of costs and beneﬁts. In our analysis, we assume that there business cannot be
conducted without investment in the private protection of property rights as Alexeev et al.
(1997) describe. Shleifer (1997) stresses that agents with private protection have an incentive
to expropriate resources from others. Hence, wide-spread private enforcement of property
rights in transition economies is inherently stable.
There are three basic negative consequences for economic growth as a result of weak
protection of property rights. First, private protection wastes resources because it is an
unproductive activity. Second, the threat of expropriation distorts the economic environment
and leads to suboptimal paths of capital accumulation and production. Third, extensive rent-
seeking and improper public protection of property rights are associated with substantial
income inequality. The impacts of inequality and redistribution policies on economic growth
are well-studied. Alesina and Rodrik (1994), Persson and Tabellini (1994), and Benabou
2Hendley, Murrell, and Ryterman (1998) analyze such strategies for Russian enterprises.
3(1996) show that inequality is harmful for growth. However, in these papers and in Perotti
(1993), the poor agents are the beneﬁciaries of redistribution through progressive taxation of
capital income, direct social transfers, extensive regulation, or trade and capital restrictions.
Based on a proportional tax on income, Persson and Tabellini (1994) also assume that
incomplete protection of property rights leads to a redistribution of wealth from rich to
poor agents. Our paper departs from this literature by assuming that rich agents are the
beneﬁciaries of redistribution.3
T h en e g a t i v ei m p a c to fw e a kp r o t e c t i o no fp roperty rights on economic growth has been
stressed at ﬁrst by Smith (1776) and later by North (1981). The spontaneous emergence
of property rights has been studied recently. Gelb, Hilman, and Ursprung (1995) note
that ambiguous property rights generate rent-seeking contests in Russia. Polishchuk and
Savvateev (1997) model a one-period rent-seeking game in which rich agents are favored at
the expense of poor agents and explore the static general equilibria properties of the model.
They argue that scale ineﬃciency in production is a major cause of rent-seeking in Russia.
Hellman (1998) discusses the political economy of partial reforms in transition economies
with an emphasis on the role that powerful rent-seekers play in keeping the economy in an
ineﬃcient state.
This paper contributes to this literature by studying the relationship of inequality and
institutional dynamics. The rich redistribute wealth away from the poor, which leads to
increased inequality, and thus more possibilities for the rich to gain from redistribution.
Increased inequality may generate a heightened political demand for better institutions,
e.g. a higher level of public property rights protection. However, if there is a signiﬁcant
wealth bias in the political system, the economy may be stuck in a long-run equilibrium in
which increasing inequality due to redistribution and decreasing level of redistribution due
to increased inequality oﬀset each other.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 contains a brief analysis of Russian
oligarchs, who are the main motivation for this paper, and presents evidence from non-
transition economies. In section 3, an endogenous growth model is introduced to investigate
the relationship between the private protection of property rights, inequality, and growth.
Section 4 analyzes the political economy of property rights protection. Section 5 concludes.
3In Acemoglu and Robinson (2000) the rich agents beneﬁt from redistribution but face a threat of revo-
lution. Do (2002) focuses on the micromechanism that relates inequality to the extent of regulatory capture.
42 T h eO l i g a r c h sa sa nE x a m p l e
Aristotle used the term oligarchy to describe a political environment, in which the rich rule
for their own interests rather than for those of the society. In modern times, this term has
been applied to the ruling elite in Imperial Japan by Ramseyer and Rosenbluth (1995) and
to families possessing signiﬁcant economic power in Latin America by Dosal (1995) and in
East Asia by Claessens et al. (2000).
Claessens et al. (2000) report that the largest ten families in Indonesia and the Philip-
pines control more than half of all corporate assets at 57.7% and 52.5%, respectively. The
concentration of control in the hands of large families is also high in Thailand at 46.2%,
Hong Kong at 32.1%, Korea, Malaysia, and Singapore at 25%.4The authors conclude that
the concentration of corporate control in the hands of a few families creates powerful abil-
ities to lobby government agencies and public oﬃcials for preferential treatment, whether
through trade barriers, non-market-based ﬁnancing, public contracts, or other means. They
assert that concentration of control might also have been a detriment to the evolution of the
countries’ legal systems.
The rule of oligarchy is often associated with weak protection of property rights. Johnson
et al. (2000) argue that the Asian ﬁnancial crisis had more severe eﬀects in countries with
weaker investor protection as measured by La Porta et al. (1997, 1998). One means of
redistributing wealth toward politically valuable agents is capital controls as Rajan and
Zingales (1998) discuss. Johnson and Mitton (2001) support strongly this point by analyzing
data on Malaysian ﬁrms before and after the imposition of capital controls. In particular,
these authors ﬁnd that the stock price performance of ﬁrms in Malaysia is broadly consistent
with the view that capital controls create a screen for cronyism.
The experiences in transition countries provide further examples of oligarchs. Glaeser,
Sheinkman, and Shleifer (2003) use the Russian oligarchs as an illustration of their subversion-
of-institutions theory. At the beginning of the Russian transition, institutional change was
expected to be driven by grass-roots demand.5Usually, it is the rich who favor full protec-
tion of property rights, because they have the most to lose in any redistribution process.
However, reality in Russia was quite diﬀerent. The Russian oligarchs, who are a small group
of politically inﬂuential people, have taken command of a major share of Russia’s produc-
tive assets. Having accumulated enormous wealth and political power, they have blocked
various attempts of the government to improve property rights protection (Polishchuk and
5Savvateev, 1997).
Freeland (2000) and Hoﬀman (2002) combine a detailed description of the oligarchs’
lives with political analysis. In the early years of transition, rents for redistribution arose
from various arbitrage opportunities, e.g., foreign trade liberalization with incomplete price
liberalization and privatization in the absence of credit markets (Barnes, 2002 and Hellman,
1998). The oligarchs rarely confronted each other; each had own branch of the economy,
e.g., mass-media for Most-bank, natural gas for Gazprom, and international weapon trade for
Rossiiskii Kredit (Freeland, 2000). However, by 1997 all of them started to acquire businesses
in unrelated ﬁelds, especially mass-media. Newspapers and broadcasting programs are an
eﬀective means of political inﬂuence. Accumulation of media-related assets by an oligarch
led to increasing political inﬂuence and thus more redistributive power. As Stiglitz (2002)
notes, demands for the rule of law have come from the oligarchs only as they have seen their
inﬂuence on Russia’s government weaken in recent years.
3 Private Enforcement of Property Rights
A standard model of endogenous growth is used to analyze the impact of incomplete property
rights on growth. In an overlapping-generations framework, agents choose the amount to
invest in production and in private protection. There is a continuum [0,1] of heterogeneous
overlapping-generations families. Each member i born at the period t has the following
utility function:
uit =l ncit + ρlndit,
where cit is consumption when young, dit is consumption when old, and ρ is the common
discount factor. Agent i is born endowed with an individual-speciﬁc basic level of skills,
denoted wit. To simplify the subsequent analysis, we assume that skills are distributed across
agents log-normally according to
lnwit ∼ N(m,σ
2).
Let wt denote the mean, and the aggregate, level of basic skills so that wt = Ewit. Intergen-
erational linkages are given as follows:
wit+1 = εit+1yit,
6where εit+1 are independent identically distributed shocks with mean equal to one and
Va r[lnεit+1]=δ
2 and yit is the second-period income of the member of family i.6Henceforth,
time indices are suppressed to focus the analysis on members of one generation.
Each agent i has access to a Cobb-Douglas technology so that second-period income
is given by yi = Ae k
β
i w1−β, where e ki is the productive capital after redistribution, A is an
exogenously given technological parameter, and w i st h ee c o n o m y - w i d ee n d o w m e n to fb a s i c
skills. The variable e ki depends not only on the capital investment ki of agent i,b u ta l s oo n
investment of agent i in private protection of property rights and on both types of investment
of the other agents. There are no credit markets so that agents cannot borrow or lend to
optimize consumption intertemporarily.
In addition to investment in production, each agent may invest in private protection of
property rights. If ki is the capital expenditures of agent i and hi is the amount invested
in protection, agent’s i productive capital is e ki = kihθ
ig after redistribution. Hence, for each
individual agent, production and private protection are strategic complements. The factor












The non-negative parameter θ measures the eﬀectiveness of protection. If θ =0 , public
protection of property rights is complete so that hi =0and g =1 , i.e. no redistribution
takes place. If θ>0, each agent invests some positive amount of capital in protection
given the redistribution technology. The balance condition indicates that such investment is
totally wasted in this negative sum game (Tullock, 1980).









Our model exhibits Tullock-type rent-seeking competition in which inputs hi are weighted
by the amount of capital invested and the entire amount of capital invested in production
becomes the rent-seeking prize. This type of redistribution possesses the basic feature of
rent-seeking, namely, relative success is a function of each agents’ respective resource com-
mitments. Speciﬁcally, an agent’s proportionate share of the prize depends positively on
his own input and negatively on the contest inputs of the others. The value of the prize,
R 1
0 kidi, is an endogenous variable because productive and expropriative capital are rival
7uses of resources (Hirshleifer, 1988 and Skaperdas, 1995). Departing from the initial Tullock













The solution can be written as:
ki = p(θ,β)wi and hi = r(θ,β)wi,
where p(θ,β) and r(θ,β) are the shares of wealth that agent i invests in production and
protection, respectively. Investment in productive capital rises with improvement of property
rights protection, i.e., as θ decreases, and productivity, β so that we have ∂
∂θp(θ,β) < 0 and
∂
∂βp(θ,β) > 0. Investment in expropriation, and thus welfare losses, increases with θ, i.e.,
∂
∂θr(θ,β) > 0. If property rights are secured fully so that θ =0 ,h i =0and each agent
divides his endowment between consumption and production.
Those agents who lose in redistribution overconsume in the ﬁrst period, while those who
gain underconsume compared to the benchmark case of θ =0 . Hence, in addition to dead-
weight losses, rent-seeking distorts the consumption of agent i. The second-period income











Summing over all agents, the growth rate of the aggregate income is expressed by:




With a low level of property rights protection, i.e. a high θ, agents divert more resources
from production to the private protection of property rights and growth is aﬀected adversely.
Proposition 1 summarizes these points; the proofs of all propositions are relegated to the
appendix.
Proposition 1 The equilibrium consumption and investment in production choices of any
agent increase with the level of property rights protection, but the equilibrium investment
in private protection decreases. The growth rate of the economy increases with the level of
property rights protection; it is maximized if property rights are fully secured, i.e., θ =0 .
8Once a private protection system is maintained, it can be used to contest many rents
simultaneously, e.g. a supportive politician may help to establish import tariﬀsi no n e
industry and shape regulation in another. As demonstrated in Claessens et al. (2000),
oligarchs tend to have diversiﬁed businesses. We show that if investment in private protection
can be used to contest other rents in addition to amending production, agents have stronger
incentives to invest in private protection. The bigger is the rent-seeking prize, the worse is
the situation. Murphy, Shleifer, and Vishny (1993) emphasize that rent-seeking may become
self-generating. For example, when foreign aid or a loan is obtained, large rent-seekers may
maintain their expropriative capabilities to strive the prize, but also use these weapons to
appropriate resources from others. Furthermore, if rent-seeking is allowed because public
protection of property rights is weak, rents from natural resources constitute an attractive
prize. Gazprom, which is a natural gas monopoly, pays roughly a quarter of all the taxes
collected by Russian government. In a developing country, rents from natural resources may
be an even greater as share of the country’s GDP.
To model the eﬀect of an exogenous ﬂow of rents to the economy, we assume that an
agent gains from pure rent-seeking in addition to beneﬁts from production and expropriation.
Agent’s i share of the prize depends positively on her own investment in private protection,
i.e., expropriation, hi, and negatively on the investment of the other agents. Speciﬁcally, we




H , where ∆
is an additional exogenous rent-seeking prize, the multiplier g is again deﬁned by the balance
condition on the capital market, and H =
R 1
0 hθ
idi. The rent-seeking technology continues to
favor rich agents as indicated by the agent-speciﬁc constant wi.7For the sake of simplicity,
we assumed that β =1 , and therefore inequality do not play any role in the subsequent




ln(wi − ki − hi)+l nAe ki
o
.
Solving this problem yields optimal investment both in production and expropriation as a
function of the exogenous rent:
ki = p(θ,∆)wi,h i = r(θ,∆)wi.
If the additional prize, ∆, is large enough, the endowment, wi, is split between consumption
in the ﬁrst period and investment in expropriation. In what follows, we assume interior
9solutions only. First, we observe that ∂
∂∆p(θ,∆) < 0 and ∂
∂∆r(θ,∆) > 0, i.e., the larger is
the rent-seeking prize, the smaller is investment in production and the larger is investment
in private protection, which increase the agent’s proceeds from rent-seeking. We state this
eﬀect in the following proposition.
Proposition 2 The larger is the additional rent-seeking prize, ∆, the lower is the growth
rate γ = γ(θ,∆) of the economy.
When investing in private protection or contesting rents, agents do not internalize the
impact of their actions on other agents’ decisions. This behavior increases the incentives
for other agents to invest into private protection and diminishes their incentives to invest
in production. The negative eﬀect on growth of weak protection of property rights has two
components. First, the lower is the level of property rights protection by the state, i.e., the
higher is θ, the more resources are devoted to private protection, which is an unproductive
activity. Second, an increase in θ makes budget constraints tighten; this eﬀect appears in
the third term of the growth equation. In the absence of asset markets, poor agents under-
invest compared to the socially eﬃcient level. Since rich agents are the main beneﬁciaries of
redistributive activity, inequality measured by σ hampers productive investment, and thus
growth, given any incomplete level of property rights protection θ, i.e., θ>0.A l t e r n a t i v e l y ,
i ft h ec a p i t a lm a r k e tw e r ep e r f e c ts ot h a tt h ei n t e r e s tr a t ee q u a l st h em a r g i n a lp r o d u c to f
productive capital, the growth rate would be γ(θ)=l nA+β lnp(θ); hence, no second eﬀect
of incomplete protection of property rights arises because all the agents will invest the same
amount of capital in production. In this case, inequality does not aﬀect the growth rate.
However, perfect capital markets are unlikely without full protection of property rights so
that we do not consider this case any further. Moreover, if loans and debts are subject to
expropriation, the above results will be essentially unchanged.
4 The Political Economy of Redistribution
Weak protection of property rights has been considered an impediment to economic growth
by many economists, e.g., Smith (1776) or North (1981). The example of the Russian oli-
garchs demonstrates that the rich agents may provide political support to the bad institution.
Our next objective is to determine the level of property rights protection preferred by agent
















In the appendix, we show that any agent i has single-peaked preferences over θ ≥ 0 so that
agent’s i problem has a unique solution, θ
∗
i. The poorer is the agent, the higher is the level
of preferred property rights protection.9Proposition 3 presents the results.




j; that is, the richer is the agent, the weaker are
preferred property rights.
(ii) There exists a unique threshold, denoted w, such that any agent i with wi ≤ w prefers
complete protection of property rights, i.e., θ
∗
i =0 , while any agent i with wi > w prefers
incomplete protection of property rights, i.e., θ
∗
i > 0.
In the recent rent-seeking literature, the level of property rights protection is often taken
to be endogenous (Grossman and Kim, 1995). However, these rent-seeking models cannot
be used to study growth issues. Perotti (1993), Alesina and Rodrik (1994), Persson and
Tabellini (1994), and Benabou (1996) do endogenize tax policy in the political equilibrium
of endogenous-growth models. In this section, we follow this procedure and endogenize
the level of property rights protection, as parametrized by θ, in an analogous way. We
assume that the old generation does not participate in the political process. Although the
obvious approach is to use the median-voter model (Grandmont, 1978), countries do not
often conform to democratic ideals. Rather, anecdotal evidence suggests that the level of
property rights protection is determined by a relatively small group of powerful agents.
Assume that the pivotal voter is located at the πth percentile of the wealth distribution
rather than the 50th.T h i s a g e n t ’ s w e a l t h wπ is characterized by F((lnwπ − m)/σ)) = π,
where F is the cumulative density function of a standard normal distribution. Hence, we
can write lnwπ = m + λσ, where λ = F−1(π). If λ>0, that is π>1
2, the political system
is biased toward rich agents. This bias may be due to their lobbying power or to imperfect
political information .
To investigate the eﬀects of this wealth bias in the political system, substitute lnwπ =
m + λσ into u0
i(θ)=0for wp ≥ w if λ ≥ e λ = σ + 1
σ and note that θ
∗ =0if λ ≤ e λ. The
following proposition summarizes the result.
11Proposition 4 (i) The more democratic is the society, i.e., the lower is the degree of wealth
bias of the pivotal voter, the more secure are property rights in the political equilibrium, i.e.
the lower is θ
∗. If λ exceeds a threshold value of e λ then θ
∗ is strictly increasing in λ.
(ii) For any pivotal voter, the higher is the productivity of production, β, or the more
valuable is the future, ρ, the more protection of property rights is preferred by the pivotal
voter.
A straightforward corollary to the ﬁrst part of the proposition is that the political equi-
librium involves complete protection of property rights, i.e., θ =0 , if and only if λ does not
exceed some threshold value. For a wide range of parameters, increased inequality reduces
the expropriation gains of rich agents, and thus makes incomplete protection less attractive.
This eﬀect complicates our analysis of the impact of inequality on growth. Although the
direct eﬀect of inequality on growth is negative, an increase in inequality leads the pivotal
voter, who, all other things being equal, becomes poorer than before, to prefer more secure
property rights and favor more growth. Therefore, the eﬀect of a change in inequality on
















where the ﬁrst term on the right-hand side represents the direct eﬀect of inequality on growth,
holding θ constant, and the second term represents the indirect eﬀect. If property rights are
protected fully, then inequality aﬀects growth exclusively through the binding wealth con-
straints. In the above analysis, we assume that the protection of property rights is provided
by the state at zero cost, which is obviously not true. If agents bear the costs of public
protection, they prefer even less such protection and the above results are strengthened.
Combining the solution to the maximization problem with intragenerational dynamics of
income within a family provides the law of motion for the family’s income:





where θt is the level of property rights protection chosen in period t. Recall that θt is chosen
by agents born in period t. Assuming that Va r[lnεit+1]=δ
2, the autoregressive process for









Hence, a reduction in the level of property rights protection, i.e., a higher θ, increases not
only current inequality, but also inequality in all future periods. The results are presented
12in the following proposition.
Proposition 5 If σ2 > 1, an increase in inequality leads weakly to a higher level of protection
of property rights by the state. If the political system exhibits a strong wealth bias, multiple
steady-states exist, including a bad equilibrium characterized by high inequality and a low
level of property rights protection.
In Russia, income inequality has increased dramatically during the transition (Kolenikov
and Shorrocks, 2000). Although the demand for public protection of property rights may
have increased, the economy need not eventually have complete protection. If a political
system has signiﬁcant wealth bias, a long-run equilibrium may involve both a low level
protection of public protection of property rights and a low growth rate. Hellman (1998)
notes that the winners in the reform process may have implicit veto power over separate
components of the reforms, especially those that aﬀect their existing rent streams. In our
model, a negative general equilibrium feedback of inequality on the level of property rights
protection worsens budget constraints; this eﬀect produces multiple long-run steady states.
Our model has implications for foreign direct investment in transition economies, which
is an important determinant of successful economic development. Brock (1998) ﬁnds that
foreign direct investment in Russia, and other FSU countries, is signiﬁcantly lower than in
the East European transition economies. Our analysis sheds some light on this observation:
First, investment in private protection wastes resources of a foreign investor. Second, overall
investment must be very large to generate redistribution gains. Finally, such an investment,
e.g., a bribe to a public oﬃcial, may be considered illegal in the domestic country of the
investor.
Glaeser et al. (2002) designate redistribution from poor to rich agents as King John
redistribution and redistribution from rich to poor agents, e.g., progressive taxation or social
security programs, as Robin Hood redistribution. Our model provides interesting insights
for both types of redistribution. In particular, having a rich pivotal voter helps to oﬀset
the eﬃciency losses from excessive taxation. Formally, suppose that the tax on capital is
progressive at some rate τ. Following Benabou (1996), we assume that redistribution is as
follows. If pre-tax capital is ki, after-tax capital is e ki = k
1−τ
i mτ, where the multiplier m is













13Incomplete protection of property rights leads again to some redistribution. As a result,

















For any θ, the growth rate function exhibits the usual properties; it is hill-shaped with
respect to the tax rate τ as Benabou (1996) demonstrates.
Proposition 6 For any tax rate τ>τ 0, there exists λ such that, for any pivotal voter with
λ>λ, the preferred levels of protection of property rights satisfy θ
∗(τ) >θ
∗(τ0).
I nw o r d s ,i ft h et a xr a t ei st o oh i g h ,t h ep i v o t a lv o t e r ,w h om u s tb er i c he n o u g ht ol o o s e
from taxation, tries to oﬀset these losses by lowering the level of public protection of property
rights. Polterovich (2001) obtains a similar result by assuming that a ﬁxed portion of the
government’s tax revenue is contested by economic agents.
The proposition illustrates a potential diﬃc u l t yf o rt h eg o v e r n m e n ti ft h et a xr a t ei sb e l o w
the growth-maximizing one. Now if the pivotal voter determining the level of property rights
protection is rich enough, an increase of taxes would not lead to the desired increase of the
growth rate, because, following an increase in taxes, the level of property rights protection
diminishes. The impact through inequality would be fully oﬀset and the only remaining
negative eﬀect of increased taxes would be on incentives to invest in production. Vice-versa,
if the tax rate is above the growth-maximizing rate, decreasing the tax rate would bring
additional beneﬁts of more secure property rights.
In most countries, the level of taxation and, more generally, redistribution policies to-
ward the poor are determined by the legislative power, e.g., a chamber of representatives.
However, the level of property rights protection or the degree of subversion of the institution
is determined endogenously by various political actors. If the level of taxation, i.e., redis-
tribution of toward the poor, and the level of property rights protection (i.e., redistribution
toward the rich) are determined non-cooperatively by diﬀerent pivotal voters, both of groups
fail to internalize the resulting losses. Intuitively, this situation is similar to the case of two
authorities competing over one tax base by independently setting tax rates, which results in
a tragedy of commons.
Our next objective is to show that the political base for economic reforms, deﬁned broadly
as measures to increase the eﬀectiveness tomorrow at a cost of today’s consumption, narrows
14when the protection of property rights is incomplete. Intuitively, with incomplete protection
of property rights, an agent is not sure whether he can transfer successfully a part of his
endowment to the second period. An agent who losses due to redistribution is less willing to
sacriﬁce consumption today for an increase in eﬃciency tomorrow. Formally, we illustrate
this idea by representing economic reform as a trade-oﬀ between today’s consumption and
enhanced production tomorrow. Suppose that, in the ﬁrst-period, agents consider paying
a ﬁxed share α of their ﬁrst-period consumption for an increase in production eﬃciency,
i.e., an increase in β, in the next period. Such a reform will be supported by agents whose
life-time utility increases. The following proposition states the main result.
Proposition 7 For large θs, the share of agents supporting reform decreases with the level
of property rights protection. The larger is inequality, the fewer voters support a reform.
This proposition shows formally that privatization and any other economic reforms aimed
to improve eﬃciency are less vulnerable to political opposition if they follow institutional
reforms, such as increasing protection of property rights by the state (Shleifer, 1997 and
Stiglitz, 2000). Countries that started transition with more inequality, or in which early
privatization increased inequality dramatically as in Russia, faced more political resistance
to economic reforms.
5C o n c l u s i o n
This paper combines the analysis of inequality and institutions by considering directly unpro-
ductive, rent-seeking activities. We identify both the inﬂuences favoring weak protection of
property rights and the political obstacles to full enforcement of property rights. Agents with
no political power to appropriate privately the fruits of their eﬀorts must devote substantial
resources to the protection of their productive capital, which reduces the attractiveness of
production. In other words, contestability of property rights diminishes incentives to invest
and accumulate capital. In theory, improvements in property rights protection, both in its
level and its eﬀectiveness, and a reduction in rent-seeking activity are preconditions for eco-
nomic growth. In reality, improvements will occur only if they are in the self-interest of the
majority of those who determine policy.
Our model provides insights into a broader issue than property rights protection; namely,
the theory of institutional choice. Suppose that a social planner can choose freely an institu-
15tional parameter, denoted θ in our model, at a cost c(θ),w h e r ec(θ) is decreasing and convex.
The parameter θ could be interpreted as the rigidity of the law so that civil law would cor-
respond to a low θ with a corresponding high cost, while common law would correspond
to higher levels of θ. The model predicts that, with high levels of inequality, lower levels
of θ are optimal, while the cost of maintaining these levels are higher. This modiﬁcation
emphasizes the trade-oﬀ between cost-eﬀectiveness of public protection, which requires high
levels of θ, and subversion (which is mitigated when θ is low). Such an extension provides a
theory of institutional choice consistent with Glaeser and Shleifer (2001 and 2002), Glaeser
et al. (2002), and Djankov et al. (2003).
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19Appendix
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n1 .
T h eg r o w t hr a t eo fa g g r e g a t ei n c o m ei sg i v e nb yγ(θ)=l n ( y/w)=l n A + β lnp −
β(1 − β)(1 + θ)2 σ2
2 . If the level of property rights protection increases, i.e., θ decreases,
p(θ,β)=
ρβ
1+ρβ(1+θ), which is the share of capital devoted to production, increases and the
term β(1 − β)(1 + θ)2 σ2
2 , which represents the losses due to redistribution and ineﬃcient
resource allocation, decreases. Thus, the growth rate γ(θ) decreases with θ.I f θ =0 , no




Inequality enters the last term of the growth rate expression only. If σ2 is larger, the
losses increase, because the budget constraints of agents become more binding in the absence
of complete ﬁnancial markets. ¥
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n2 .






. The ﬁrst-order condi-
tions are as follows: 1
wi−ki−hi = A















where the balance condition gives gH = eθσ2. Then the growth rate is given by










Clearly, the growth rate decreases with ∆ and is maximized when ∆ =0 .¥
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n3 .
First, we prove that the following function:










is single-peaked for each i. For the maximization problem maxθ≥0 ui(θ), the ﬁrst-order
condition is
1+ρβ
1+ρβ(1+θ) + σ2(1 + θ)=l nwi − m. Deﬁne ψ(θ)=
1+ρβ
1+ρβ(1+θ) +σ2(1 + θ) and note










1+ρβ > 0. Hence, ψ
0(θ) > 0
for all θ ≥ 0 so that ψ(θ) is an increasing function of θ ≥ 0. Therefore, the ﬁrst-order
condition ψ(θ)=l nwi−m has at most one non-negative root θ ≥ 0; in which case u0
i(θ) > 0,
if 0 ≤ θ<θ, and u0
i(θ) < 0, if θ<θ .If ψ(θ) has non-negative roots, i.e, ψ(0) ≥ lnwi − m,
then u0
i(θ) < 0 for all θ ≥ 0, and therefore, θ
∗
i =0 .
20Now deﬁne w such that lnw =l nw +1+σ2
2 , where w = Ewi = em+σ2
2 . To demonstrate




j =0for wj ≤ wi ≤ w . To show that
θ
∗















To demonstrate the second part of the proposition, suppose that wi ≤ w = e1+m+σ2.
Then ψ(0) = 1 + σ2 ≥ lnwi − m. Since ψ
0(θ) > 0 for all θ ≥ 0,θ
∗
i =0as shown above. If
wi > w, the equation ψ(θ)=l nwi − m has a positive root, θ
∗
i.¥
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n4 .
The level of property rights protection by the state is determined by the pivotal agent





∗)=l nwπ − m = λσ. Since ψ is strictly increasing in θ, the lower is λ, i.e., the
wealth bias, the lower is θ
∗, i.e., the higher is the equilibrium level of protection. A lower θ
∗
corresponds to more protection. From Proposition 3, if λσ > 1+σ2, then θ
∗ > 0. On the
other hand, if λσ ≤ 1+σ2, then θ
∗ =0 . Therefore, an agent with λ = σ+ 1
σ is the wealthiest
agent voting for complete public protection of property rights. ¥
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n5 .
If θ
∗ =0 , there is nothing to prove, so assume that θ
∗ = θ
∗(σ) > 0. The ﬁrst-order condi-
tion for the level-of-protection maximization problem (maxθ≥0 ui(θ))i sa sf o l l o w s :
1+ρβ
1+ρβ(1+θ∗) =




Since σ>1, either σ ≥ λ
2, or σ ≥ 2
λ. First, assume that σ ≥ λ
2. Suppose that σ is
increased by ∆σ ≥ 0. Note that θ
∗(σ+∆σ) ≤ θ




∗) ≥ λ(σ + ∆σ), or, equivalently, (2σ∆σ + ∆σ2)(1 + θ
∗) ≥ λ∆σ. Dividing by ∆σ, we get
(2σ + ∆σ)(1 + θ





σ2 >λ .Since 1+θ
∗ > λσ−1
σ2 , 2σ(1 + θ
∗) ≥ λ, and the rest
of the proof is as above.
To demonstrate the existence of multiply steady states, observe that the following two









1+ρβ(1+θ∗) = λσ − σ2(1 + θ
∗).


























2 = λσ. It is straightforward to show that the left-hand side
of the equation is an increasing concave function. Hence, there exists some λ such that for
any λ ≥ λ, there are at least two steady-states.¥
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n6 .
In fact, Proposition 5 holds for all θ ≥ 0. The higher is the tax rate, the more equal is the
after-tax distribution of wealth. Then Proposition 5 can be applied to show that a higher
tax rate leads to a lower level of property rights protection.¥
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n7 .
Suppose that the reform requires each agent i to pay a share of α for the increase in
productivity from β to β
0. Then, agent i supports the reform as long as
β
0 lnp(θ,β











0) − β lnp(θ,β)
(β






0 − β)(1 + θ)2.
From the above equation, the threshold e w = e w(θ) can be determined so that any agent i
with wi ≥ e w supports the reform. For large θ, e w(θ) is strictly increasing in θ.¥
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